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Mar.1954J T. & S. F. RY. Co. 577 
P.2d 457] 
be sustained because proper instructions were not 
requested." v. sttpra, 27 Cal.2d 176.) 
Since the facts revealed the entirely 
circumstantial in show the case to be a very close one 
on the questions of sanity, and we must 
conclude that the numerous errors reviewed herein substan-
tially and prejudicially affected the of defendant . 
.Accordingly, a reversal is necessary to a uue>v<uL 
of justice. 
The judgment and the order denying defendant's motion 
for a new trial are reversed. 
Gibson, C. J., Carter, J., and Schauer 
Spence, J., concurred in the judgment. 
concurred. 
[L. A. No. 22934. In Bank. Mar. 31, 1954.] 
ROY D. PRICE, .Appellant, v. THE .ATCHISON, TOPEKA 
.AND S.ANT .A FE RAIL W .A Y CO MP .ANY (a Corpora-
tion), Respondent. 
[1] Courts-Jurisdiction-Transitory Actions.-The rule of forum 
non conveniens is an equitable one embracing discretionary 
power of a court to decline to exercise tho jurisdiction it has 
over a transitory cause of action when it believes that the 
action may be more appropriately and justly tried elsewhere. 
[2] Master and Servant-Federal Liability Act-Juris-
diction.-In refusing to exercise jurisdiction under the doctrine 
of forum non conveniens a state may not, by reason of privileges 
and immunities clause of federal Constitution (art. IV, § 2), 
allow suits in its courts by its own nonresident citizens for lia-
bility under Federal Employers' Liability Act out of 
conduct outside that state and discrirninatorily deny access to 
its courts to a nonresident who is a citizen of another state; 
but if a state chooses to prefer residents in access to often 
overcrowded eourts and to deny such access to all nonresi-
dents, whether its own citizens or those of other states, it is a 
choice within its own control. 
[1] See Courts, § 228 et seq. 
[2] Power of state or state eourt to decline of action 
under Federal Employers' Liability Act, note, 158 A.L.R. 1022. 
See, also, Am.Jur., Master and Servant, § 455. 
McK. Dig. References: [1, 3, 8] Courts, § 24; [2, 4, 7] Master 
and Servant,§ 204; [5, 6] Courts,§ 24; Master and Servant,§ 204. 
42 C.2d-19 · 





a statute of n sister state or a statute 
that !a w of sister state is not in 
direct conflict with exp1·ess policy 
of California and i~ not <oo"1trary to fundamental principles 
of justice or morals or injmious to welfare of the people. 
[ 4] Master and Servant- Federal Liability Act-
Jurisdiction.-California courts accept jurisdiction of Fed-
eral Ad eases both as to causes of 
action which arise in this state and as to those which arise 
outside state in fa \'Or of nonresident noncitizen plaintiffs 
against a corporation business in this state. 
[5] Courts-Jurisdiction- Transitory Actions: Master and Ser-
vant-Federal Liability Act---Jurisdiction.-Cali-
fornia has no poliey, either statutory or eourt made, of dis-
crimination against either noneitizens of this state or against 
Federal Employers' LiDbility Aet aetions in determining when 
a nonresident of thic; state will be given access to state courts 
to litigate a cause of action which arose elsewhere. (Dis-
approving any contrary implications in Schultz v. Union Pacific 
R. R. Co., llK 169, 2:")7 P.2d 1003.) 
[6] !d.-Jurisdiction--Transitory Actions: Master and Servant-
Federal Employers' J_.iability Act- Jurisdiction.-Upon a 
proper showing and without discrimination against either 
noncitizens of California or against Federal Employers' Lia-
Act ca~l·s, the doctrin'l of forttm non cowceniens is avail-
able in this state. 
[7] Master and Servant- Federal Employers' Liability Act-
Jurisdiction.--Although there is no statutory authorizntion 
foT transfer of Federnl I£mployers' Liability Act cases by state 
courts, ::md under doctrine of non conveniens 
a cause arising outside California will be dismissed rather 
than transferred, the injustices and burdens on loeal courts 
and taxpayers, as well as on those leaving their work and 
business to serve as which can follow from an unchecked 
and unregulated importation of transitory causes of action 
for trial in this state, require that our courts, acting on equi-
table principles and within limitations imposed by 
and immunities clause of federal ConsLitution (art. IV, 2), 
exercise their discretionary power to decline to proceed in 
those causes of action which conclude, on satisfactory evi-
dence, may be more appropriately and justly tried elsewhere. 
[8] Courts-Jurisdiction-Transitory Acts.-If plaintiff chooses 
without justification to bring his action under circumstances 
warranting application o£ doctrine of forum non conveniens 
Mar. 1954] PRICE v. ATcHisoN, T. & S. F. RY. Co. 579 
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it is a deliberate risk assumed him and he must be preparPd 
to meet any losses sustained as a result, including that of bar 
of his rights statutes of limitation. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County. Roy L. Judge. Affirmed in part 
and reversed in part. 
Action under Federal Employers' Liability Act for dam-
ages for personal injuries. Judgment of dismissal reversed 
as to one cause of action; affirmed as to other cause of action. 
Hildebrand, Bills & McLeod and D. W. Brobst for Ap-
pellant. 
Robert W. Walker, Frederic .l1.. Jacobus and J. H. Cummins 
for Respondent. 
SCHAUER, J.-'l'his case presents the question of the avaiT-
ability in California of the doctrine off ontrn non conveniens as 
a ground for refusal by a court to exercise jurisdiction over 
a cause of action which arose outside the state's boundaries. 
"vVe have concluded that upon a proper showing and within 
the limitations imposed the privileges and immunities clause 
of the federal Constitution (art. IV, § 2) the doctrine may be 
• • • 1!@1; 
apphed m tlns state. 
Plaintiff filed this action in the superior court in Los An-
geles, under the of the Pederal Employers' Lia-
bility Act ( 45 u.S. C.A. § 51 et seq.), hereinafter termed the 
FELA, to recoyer for personal injuries allegedly sustained by 
him on two different occasions while employed by defendant 
railroad company in interstate commerce. Both accidents oc-
CUlTed in New 1\Iexico.«> Defendant answered with a general 
denial, and also pleaded negligence by plaintiff, 1 
and a settlement and release agreement made with plaintiff 
in New Mexico with respect to the first accident. Defendant 
further pleaded a special defense based on the doctrine of 
fortlrn non and in addition moved under that doc-
trine to diflmiss the complaint. F'ollowing a hearing, the trial 
court granted defendant's motion, judgment of dismissal was 
entered accordingly, and this by plaintiff followed. 
From the pleadings and affidavits upon which defendant's 
motion to dismiss was based, the following facts appear: 
'In diminution of damages under the comparative negligence doctrine 
applicable to FEL.A actions. ( 45 U.S.C . .A. § 53.) 
580 PRICE v. ATcmsoN, T. & S. F. RY. Co. [42 C.2d 
was a resident anfl citizen of the State of New Mexico 
both at the time of the accidents and when this action was 
in Los Defendant is a Kansas corporation 
business in both New and All of the 
witnesses to accidents reside New Mexico rather than in 
this state. In order to defend the action defend-
to at 
for thdr 
treated in New Mexico. It was uncertain, how-
eYer, whether any of the doctors would find it possible to leave 
their a trial in Los and if not then 
to present their testimonies by 
at the loss of the of their personal 
appearance as 1vitnesses. Defendant estimated that the trial 
·would last fin~ to seven days and that the total 
extra cost of the action in Los Angeles rather than 
would be During the years 1947 
Hl<:H<•cur.L~ Oetober 1952, the firm of attorneys 
action for filed in the superior court 
in Los 67 actions against defendant based upon 
in otl1er states under the F'ELA, and 
cases in the federal district courts 
in this state. None of the aboye related facts are denied by 
plaintiff or his counsel. 
As declared in Leet v. Union Pew. R. R. Co. (1944), 25 
609 P.2d 158 A.L.R. 1008], "The rule of 
nonconveniens is an equitable one embracing the dis-
eretionary power of a court to decline to exercise the jurisdic-
tion it has over a cause of aetion when it believes 
that the action before it may be more appropriately and justly 
tried elsewhere. And in Oil v. Gilbert (1947), 
330 ·c.S. 501. S.Ct. 839, 91 L.Ed. 1055, 1062], it is 
statnd that ''As formulated :Mr. Justice the rule 
is: ' ... Courts of and of law also occasionally decline, 
in the interest of to exercise jurisdiction, where the 
suit is between aliens or non-residents or where for kindDed 
reasons the can more appropriately be conducted in 
tribunal.' Canada Co., Ltd., v. Paterson 
Lid. , 285 U.S. 413, 422, 423 [52 S.Ct. 413, 
76 hEel. 837] .... The of foTum non conveniens is 
simply that a eourt may resist imposition upon its jurisdiction 
Mar.1954] PRICE v. ATCHISON, T. & S. F. RY. Co. 581 
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even when is authorized the letter of a 
cases cited in opmwn 
Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. 
(1941), 314 U.S. 55 S.Ct. 6, 86 hEd. 136 A.L.H. 
1222] .) It is conceded that under section 6 of the FELA 
U.S.C.A. § 562 ) the California court has of both 
the subject matter and the involved in this action. 
In the Leet case we held that a court of this state 
jurisdiction over an action under the .B1 ELA could not refuse 
to exercise it. Our was based upon our 
view that the decision of the United States Supreme Court 
in Miles v. Illino·is Central R. B. Co. (1942), 315 U.S. 698 [62 
S.Ct. 827, 86 I.~.Ed. 1129], was " decisive that the 
doctrine of nonconveniens is no justification for a state 
court to refuse of an action under the Federal 
Employers' Liability Act. it is conclusive that the 
state court 1n11st take jurisdiction. It has no choice in the 
matter and no rule or policy on its part alters the situation 
[pp. 612-613 of 25 ... From the foregoing it is clear 
that the California court had jurisdiction to with the 
trials of the above entitled causes and was required to exercise 
such jurisdiction. [P. 616] ... " It now appears, however, 
that since our decision in the Leet case the United States Su-
preme Court has considered the question in Southern R. Co. 
v.lliayfield (1950), 340 U.S. 1 S.Ct. 1, 95 L.Ed. 3, 6], and 
has declared that the Miles case did not limit ''the power of a 
State to deny access to its courts to persons seeking recovery 
under the Pederal Employers' Liability Act if in similar cases 
the State for reasons of local policy denies resort to its courts 
and enforces its policy impartially . . . so as not to involve a 
discrimination against Employers' Liability Act suits and not 
to offend against the Privileges-and-Immunities Clause of the 
Constitution,'' and that if a state court held to the contrary 
"because it felt under compulsion of federal law as enunciated 
by this Court so to hold, it should be relieved of that compul-
sion.'' The court further expressly recognized the power of 
each state ''According to its own notions of procedural policy 
2Section 56: ''No action shall be maintained under this chapter unless 
commenced within three years from the day the canRe of action accrued. 
''Under this chapter an action may be brought in a district court of 
the United States, in the district of the residence of the defendant, or in 
which the cause of action arose, or in which the defendant shall be doing 
business at the time of commencing such action. The jurisdiction of the 
courts of the United States under this chapter shall be concurrent with 
that of the courts of the several States.'' 
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as it may the doctrine [of non 
for all causes of action begun in its courts,'' in-
those under the ];'ELA, so long as it discrimin-
ates against neither citizens of sister states nor FELA actions. 
In other words, as declared in the Mayfield case, in 
refusing to exercise jurisdiction under the doctrine of forum 
non a state may by reason of the privileges and 
immunities clause of the federal Constitution IV, § 2), 
allow suits in its courts by its own nonresident citizens ''for 
liability under the ]'ederal Employers' Liability Act arising 
out of conduct outside that State and discriminatorily deny 
access to its courts to a non-resident who is a citizen of another 
State. But if a State chooses to '[prefer] residents in access 
to often overcrowded Courts' and to deny such access to all 
non-residents, whether its own citizens or those of other States, 
it i,; a choice within its own control. This is true also of actions 
for personal injuries under the Employers' Liability Act. 
Douglas v. New J7 ark, N. II. & H. R. Co. [1929], 279 U.S. 377, 
387 S.Ct. 355, 73 L.Ed 747]. Whether a State makes such 
a choice is, like its acceptance or rejection of the doctrine of 
non conveniens, a question of State law not open to 
review" by the Vnited States Supreme Court, provided the 
state ''enforces its impartially ... so as not to involve 
a discrimination against Employers' Liability Act suits and 
not to offend against the Privileges-and-Immunities Clause of 
the Constitution.'' (Pp. 3-4 of 340 U.S.) In the Douglas ease 
the court declared (p. 387 of 279 U.S.), '"I'here are manifest 
reasons for preferring residents in access to often overcrowded 
Courts, both in convenience and in the fact that broadly speak-
ing it is they who pay for maintaining the Courts concerned.'' 
[3] It is unquestioned that the courts of this state have 
accepted and exercised jurisdiction over transitory causes of 
action, which arose outside of California in favor of citizens 
of other jurisdictions, nonresident in California, whether based 
on the common-law or a statute of a sister state or a statute 
of the United States (see Schultz v. Union Pac1>jic R. R. Co. 
(1953), 118 Cal.App.2c1169, 178 [257 P.2d 1003], and author-
ities cited in footnote 17, 118 Cal.App.2d 178), provided the 
law of the sister state is not in direct conflict with the express 
provisions of the law or the public policy of California and 
is not contrary to fundamental principles of justice or good 
morals, or injurious to the welfare of the people. (Lomnger 
v. Nadcan (1932), 215 Cal. 362, 366 [10 P.2d 63, 84 A.L.R. 
1264]; Hudson v. Von IIamm (1927), 85 Cal.App. 323, 326-
Mar. PRICE 'V. ATcmso:;c T. & S. F. RY. Co. 583 
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331 ; Thome v. Jllacken (1943), 58 CaL<\pp.2d 
76 .) California courts have also ac-
eepted jurisdiction of FEI1A eases both as to causes of action 
which arose in this and as to those vvhieh arose outside 
California in favor of nonresident noncitizen against 
a business in this state. (See Leet v. 
Union Pac. R. R. Co. (J , snpm, 25 Cal.2d 605; Estate of 
lV a its (1944), 23 Cal.2d 678-679 [146 P .2d 5].) 
[5]'/ It is thus clear that this state has no either 
statutory or court of diserimination against either non-
citizens of or against FEIJA actions in determining 
when a nonresident of this state will be given access to 
courts to litigate a cause of action whieh arose and 
any eontrary implications in Schultz v. Union Pacific R. R. Co . .1' 
(1953), supra, 118 Cal. A pp.2d 169, 179, 181, are disapproved. 
1'he Leet ease, discussed hereinabove, appears to have pre-
sented the first instance in which the doctrine of non 
conveniens has been considered and discussed by this court, 
and as already mentioned we rejeeted it in connection with 
the FELA litigation there involved because of our belief that 
we were so compelled by the decision of the United States 
Supreme Court in the Miles ease. [6] But since that court, 
in the Mayfield case, has now lifted that compulsion (if it ever 
intended any), we perceive no reason why the doctrine should 
not be available in this state, upon a proper showing and with-
out discrimination against either noncitizens of California or 
against FEL,\ cases. So far as concerns the FELA, 
in 1948 empo1Yered the federal district courts to 
transfer ''any civil action,'' including those based on the 
VEIJA, to any other district or division where it might have 
hePn brought ''for the eonvenience of parties and witnesses, 
in the interest of jnstice." (28 U.S.C.A. § 1404; see Ex parte 
Collett (1949), 337 TT.S. 55 [69 S.Ct. 944,959,93 L.Ecl.l207, 10 
A.I;.R.2d 921]; Boud v. Grand Trunk Western R. Co. (1949), 
838 U.S. 263 /70 S.Ct. 26, 94 L.Ed. 55] ; Pope v . .Atlantic 
Coast Line R. Co. (1953), 345 U.S. 379 [73 S.Ct. 749, 97 
L.Ed. 1094] .) Although there is no statutory authoriza-
tion for snch transfer state courts, and although under 
the cloctrine of non com,cn·iens a cause arising outside 
California vl'ill he dismissed rather than transferred, we are 
of the view tl1at the injustices and the burdens on local courts 
and taxpayer-s, ns well as on those leaving their work and busi-
ness to serve as jurors, which can follow from an unchecked 
and unregulated importation of transitory causes of action 
584 T. & S. F. RY. Co. [42 C.2d 
discussion 35 Cal.L.Rev. 402-415) 
that our upon the principles 
and within the constitutional limits stated, exer-
power to decline to proceed in those 
on evidence, 
may be more tried elsewhere. (See 
Leet v. Um.on Pac. R. R. , snpra, 25 CaL2d 609.) 
A would result in the that a federal 
district court situated in California could in the interest of 
transfer to another district or division an FELA action 
of the involved state 
A~,,~""'~ jurisdiction 
over actions in those courts. We are per-
suaded that such a result would be of neither fair-
ness, nor intent when removal power 
was bestowed upon the federal district courts. 
With to situations in which a court is 
an action under the doctrine of forum 
it was out in Oil v. Gilbert 
) , supra, 330 U.S. in sustaining the power 
of a federal district court in New York to dismiss a diversity 
of case based upon a tort which occurred in 
Lynchburg, Virginia,3 that "Many of the states have met 
misuse of venue courts with a discretion to change 
the place of trial on various such as the convenience 
of witnesses and the ends of justice. The federal law con-
tains no such express criteria to guide the district court in 
its power. But the problem is a very old one 
aft'ecting the administration of the courts as well as the 
rights of litigants, and both in England and in this country 
the common law worked out techniques and criteria for dealing 
with it. 
"\Visely, it has not been attempted to catalogue the cir-
cmnstances which will or require either grant or 
denial of 'fhe doctrine leaves much to the discretion 
to ·which resorts, and experience has 
to renounce one's own jurisdic-
ticm so as to result in many abuses. 
''If the combination and weight of factors requisite to 
results are difficult to forecast or state, those to be 
considered are not difficult to name. An interest to be con-
and the one to be most pressed, is the private 
'As noted hereinabove, removal power was by statute given to the 
federal district courts the following year (1948). 
Mar. T. & S. F. RY. Co. 585 
interest of the considerations are the 
relative ease of access to sources of proof; availability of com-
process for attendance of and the cost of 
"""'"Ll""""' attendance of witnesses; possibility of view 
if view would be appropriate to the action; and 
that make trial of a case easy, 
'l'here may also be questions as 
of a if one is obtained. The 
court will relative advantages and obstacles to fair trial. 
It is often said that the plaintiff may not, by choice of an 
inconveni(Jlt 'vex,' 'harass,' or 'oppress' the de-
fendant inflicting upon him expense or trouble not neces-
sary to his own to pursue his remedy. ~ut unless the 
balance is strongly in favor of the defendant, the plaintiff's 
choice of forum should be disturbed. V 
'' Pactors of public interest also have place in applying 
the doctrine. Administrative difficulties follow for courts 
when litigation is piled up in congested centers instead of 
being handled at its origin. duty is a burden that 
ought not to be upon the people of a community 
which has no relation to the litigation. In cases which touch 
the affairs of many there is reason for holding the 
trial in their view and reach rather than in remote parts of 
the country where can learn of it by report only. There 
is a local interest in localized controversies decided 
at home. too, in having the 
trial of a diversity case in a forum that is at home with 
the state law that must govern the case, rather than having 
a court in some other forum untangle problems in conflict of 
laws, and in law foreign to itself.'' In determining that in 
applying the doctrine the district court had exercised a sound 
discretion, the court noted that defendant was a Pennsylvania 
corporation doing business in both Virginia and New York, 
and (pp. that .neither the plaintiff nor any witness, 
with the possible of experts, lived in New York; 
that no one connected with plaintiff's side of the case save 
counsel for resided there; that plaintiff's only justifi-
cation for trial in New York was the argument, re-
jected by both the district court and the United States 
Supreme Court, that the size of the recovery sought by him 
(some $400,000) might more readily "stagger" a jury from 
Lynchburg, than one from New York; that Lynch-
burg, the source of all proofs for either side, except possibly 
experts, was some 400 miles from New York; and that "to 
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fix the place of trial at a where litigants cannot compel 
personal attendance and may be forced to try their cases on 
deposition, is to create a condition not satisfactory to court, 
jury or most litigants.'' 
As already noted hereinabove, in the present case plaintiff 
does not controvert the facts alleged by defendant as a basis 
for invoking the doctrine of fontm non conveniens. More-
over, the only ground urged by plaintiff for trial in this state 
is his claim of an absolute right thereto, a right which, as we 
have seen, has been negated by the holding of the United 
States Supreme Court in the Mayfield case. Under such cir-
cumstances, we are of the opinion that although as in the 
Gulf Oil Corp. case (330 U.S. 501, 507-509) from which we 
have just quoted, there is no "express [statutory J criteria 
to guide the . . . [trial] court in exercising its power,'' 
nevertheless that court here properly acted within its dis-
cretion in granting defendant's motion to dismiss. The 
difficulties and inconvenience to defendant, to the court, and 
to jurors hearing the case, of attempting to proceed where 
witnesses are not amenable to process, and where testimony 
may have to be presented by deposition, are apparent. The 
added expense to defendant of either attempting to bring 
witnesses from New Mexico to Los Angeles or of having to 
take their depositions, when not counterbalanced by even a 
claim of advantage or convenience to plaintff, was another 
factor properly to be taken into consideration. And as al-
ready mentioned, the expense and burden resulting to local 
taxpayers, courts, and jurors, of providing a forum for the 
trial of imported cases also weigh against plaintiff. 
[8] The suggestion (although not advanced by plaintiff 
here) that the doctrine should not apply because if an action 
filed by a nonresident plaintiff is dismissed by the Cali-
fornia courts his rights may be barred by limitations statutes 
is without merit; if plaintiff chooses without justification to 
bring his action under circumstances warranting application 
of the doctrine it is a deliberate risk assumed by him and he 
must be prepared to meet any losses sustained as a result. 
Moreover, as to FELA cases, any such risk could be obviated 
by filing in a federal district court, in which the action 
would be subject to removal "for the convenience of parties 
and witnesses, in the interest of justice,'' rather than to 
dismissal (28 U.S.C.A. § 1404). In the present case, how-
ever, the statute of limitations will, on February 15, 1954, 
have run with respect to the first cause of action and, solely 
1\far. 1954] PRICE v. ATcHISON, T. & S. F. RY. Co. 587 
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in order to avoid on plaintiff's behalf the bar of the statute 
of limitations, defendant has entered into a stipulation with 
plaintiff that the judgment of the trial court herein shall 
be reversed as to the first cause of action. In view of such 
stipulation and of tile fact that until this present decision 
it had been declared to be the law of this state (in Leet v. 
Union Pac. R. R. Co. (1944), supra, 25 Cal.2d 605, 609) 
that our courts were compelled to reject the doctrine of 
forwn non conveniens with respect to FELA cases, and in 
order that as to the first cause of action plaintiff may not 
through reliance upon the Leet decision be barred by the 
statute of limitations, we have concluded that the judgment 
should be reversed as to that cause of action. 
Accordingly, for the reasons stated, the judgment is re-
versed as to the first cause of action, and is affirmed as to 
the second cause of action, neither party to recover costs 
on appeal. 
Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Traynor, J., and Spence, J., 
concurred. 
CARTER, J.-I dissent. 
'l'he holding of the majority in this case injects into the 
law of this state for the first time in its entire judical history 
the most monstrous weapon for obstructing the administra-
tion of justice ever conceived by any court or judicial tribunal. 
'l'his holding places it within the power of a trial court to 
dismiss a transitory action which arose out of this state, 
even though plaintiff was a citizen of this state, and had a 
statutory right to prosecute such an action in the courts of 
this stateA This must be so because the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to the Constitution of the United States provides: "N0 
state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States." 
Therefore, a statute, or court-made rule of law which would 
permit a trial court to dismiss an action brought by a citizen 
of another state upon a cause of action arising out of this 
state would be invalid unless it was applied eq11ally against 
eitizens of this state. (Douglas v. New York, N. H. & H. R. 
Go., 279 U.S. 377 !49 S.Ct. 355, 73 L.Ed. 747] .) 
-While it may be true that a state could refuse to confer 
jurisdiction upon its courts to handle such cases, it may not 
deny the privilege to some citizens of the United States and 
not to others. We then have this anomalous situation created 
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by the majority decision in this case. A citizen of this state 
is injured in another state. He commences an action in this 
state for redress of such .1:\ motion to dismiss on 
the ground of non com'cn?,ens JS made. If be resists 
the motion he is faced with the 
trial and upon an this 
his favor reversed because the trial 
such motion. It must then follow 
dismissed and in the meantime the statute 
run in the state where the cause of aetion In response 
to his outcry against this the 
of this court say to him · ''It is bad. You should 
have guessed what we would do--whenever don't like 
what the trial court we say, it abused its discretion 
and we reverse its decision." S.F. 
No. 18781, ante, p. 500 [267 
12th, 1954; Carroll v. S.F. No. 
p. 874 [267 P.2c1 10371, decided March 1954; Leipet·t 
v. Honold, 39 Cal.2d 462 P.2d 29 A.L.R.2d 1185]; 
Rose v. Melody Lane, 39 Cal.2d 481 P.2d 335]; Car·y 
v. Wentzel, 39 Cal.2d 491 P.2d .Hamasaki v. 
Flo tho, 39 Cal.2d 602 P .2d . ) 
And so, in effect, the of the here means, 
that it will never be safe for any citizen of the United States 
to prosecute in the courts of this a cause of action which 
arose in another state or 'fhe 
risk, first of a judgment of dismissal a trial 
even if he prevails he is faced with the prospect of a 
reversal by this court vvith direction to the trial court to 
dismiss the action. who has had experience 
in the trial of cases knows that the ultimate outcome of any 
case of this character upon the of the members 
of the court which has the last say and there can never be 
a rule to guide the course which he should pursue. · 
The majority holding is based on two major premises, 
and it is not clear which is here. the 
majority discusses the inconvenience and expense to the de-
fendant to present its defense to the action if tried in Los 
Angeles County. Second, the burden upon the courts 
people of this state to hear and determine cases of 
character. First, since the has 
prosecute such an action in a state court 
inconvenience of the defendant, he should not be 
such right by a court-made rule. If there is to be a 
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by the and not by the 
courts. doctrine of non conveniens is 
that such actions are a burden upon the 
courts and the of this then all causes of action 
out of this state must be barred. Certainly, if it may 
be said that causes of action out of this state are a 
burden on courts and the of this state, the courts 
cannot say that some of such actions may be tried in our courts 
and others not. other so far as the burden upon 
our courts is must be open to all citizens of 
the United States who have such causes of action to prosecute, 
or to none at all. Otherwise the privileges and immunities 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is meaningless. Yet the 
majority opinion conveys the inference that this latter ground 
is also within the diseretion of the court in ruling on a motion 
to dismiss on the ground of non conveniens. Obviously 
this cannot be so. it remains to be seen whether or 
not the cases to which the doctrine is applied by the 
majority of this court are those arising under the Federal 
Employers' Act. 
The majority concedes that the courts of this state may not 
apply the doctrine of non conveniens discriminately 
against Federal ' Liability k~ct cases. In view of 
the fact that there are more than 235 superior judges sitting 
in the various counties of this state, it is obvious that the doc-
trine will be some and not by others in cases of 
similar factual It is far from probable that there 
will be any uniformity in its application. Since these cases 
constitute by far the group of out-of-state cases which 
are prosecuted in our courts it is not unlikely that they will 
be the only cases in which the doctrine is applied. But how 
and when may this be determined~ Must a plaintiff have to 
wait one, two or more years and then make an examination 
of the register of actions in all of the superior courts of this 
state in order to determine whether or not there has been dis-
crimination against this class of cases? .At this writing the 
task of showing such discrimination would seem to me to be an 
impossible burden to place upon any litigant or group of liti-
gants, especially working men who are seeking redress 
for their injuries under the Federal Employers' Liability .Act . 
.And yet, the majority of this court, in utter disregard of these 
considerations, announces a rule here which can only result 
in depriving the plaintiffs in Federal Employers' Liability .Act 
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cases, arising out of this state, from seeking redress in the 
courts of this state pursuant to the provisions of said act. 
It may be reminiscent of a few decades ago that the railroad 
companies have been able to accomplish through the majority 
decision in this case what they have been unable to accomplish 
through the legislative and executive branches of both the state 
and federal governments. .At the 1953 session of the California 
Legislature two bills were introduced which purported to in-
corporate the doctrine of forum non conveniens into the law of 
this state. These bills were Senate Bills No. 789 and 1960. 
They passed both houses of the Legislature and Senate Bill 
No. 789 was vetoed by the then Governor Earl Warren, now 
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States. In 
his veto message on this bill he stated: "If we are to whittle 
away in this manner the benefits conferred by the Federal Em-
ployers' Liability .Act, it would soon lose its national uniform-
ity and could at least substantially weaken the purposes for 
which the act was originally designated. I am not advised that 
other states have enacted such legislation. The fact that this 
act has been in effect since 1908 without similar legislation 
being enacted in other states would indicate a nationwide 
appreciation of the desirability for this uniformity. .At all 
events if any of the provisions of the act result in a denial 
of justice to either plaintiffs or defendants, the situation could 
be remedied nationwide by a simple act of Congress." Senate 
Bill No. 1960 was passed during the closing days of the legis-
lative session and did not become effective because of lack of 
executive approval. 
It appears from the Congressional Record that at the time 
Congress enacted section 1404(a) (28 U.S.C.A.), which in 
effect incorporated the doctrine of forum non conveniens in 
federal courts, it refused to enact a bill which would have 
amended section 6 of the Federal Employers' Liability Act by 
limiting the employee's choice of venue to the place of his in-
jury or to the place of his residence. The language used by 
Governor Warren in his veto message on Senate Bill No. 789 is 
almost the precise language used by the Supreme Court of the 
United States in the very recent case of Pope v. Atlantic Coast 
LineR. Co., 345 U.S. 379 [73 S.Ct. 749, 97 L.Ed. 1094], where 
that court held that a nonresident could not be foreclosed from 
filing an action under the Federal Employers' Liability Act. 
In that case the Supreme Court said: ''Congress might have 
gone further; it might have vested state courts with the power 
asserted here. In fact, the same Congress which enacted 
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§ 1404 (a) [ re forum non conveniens in federal courts] refused 
to enact a bill which would have amended § 6 of the Federal 
Employers' Liability Act by limiting the employee's choice of 
venue to the place of his injury or to the place of his residence. 
"This proposed amendment-the Jennings Bill-focused 
Congress' attention on the decisions of this Court in both the 
Miles and the Kepner cases. The broad question-involving 
many policy considerations-of whether venue should be more 
narrowly restricted, >vas reopened; cogent arguments-both 
pro and con-were restated. Proponents of the amendment 
asserted that, as a result of the Miles and Kepner decisions, 
injured employees were left free to abuse their venue rights 
under § 6 and 'harass' their employers in distant forums with-
out restriction. They insisted that these abuses be curtailed. 
These arguments prevailed in the House, which passed the 
,Jennings Bill, but the proposed amendment died in the Senate 
.Judiciary Committee, and § 6 of the Federal Employers' Lia-
bility Act was left just as this Court had construed it." 
The Jennings Bill was the same type of bill as Senate Bill 
No. 1960. Had the Congress of the United States intended 
that the jurisdiction in federal employers' liability cases was 
to be restricted to the states where the cause of action arose 
or where the plaintiff resided it would have enacted the J en-
nings Bill. The Congressional Record discloses that in recent 
years several attempts have been made by the railroad com-
panies to induce Congress to adopt similar bills and each of 
such attempts has resulted in failure. This should constitute 
conclusive evidence that the statute as it now exists does not 
work an undue hardship upon the railroad companies affected 
by its provisions or is out of harmony with considerations of 
justice underlying the basic concept of the Federal Employers' 
I~iability Act. 
On May 2d, 1953, the District Court of Appeal, Second Ap-
pellate District, Division Three, in its decision in Schultz v. 
Union Pac. R. Co., 118 Cal.App.2d 169 [257 P.2d 1003], after 
an exhaustive review of all of the authorities followed the deci-
sion of the Pope case and again stated that the jurisdiction 
conferred by the Federal Employers' Liability Act should not 
be interfered with by the courts or by state legislation. In the 
Schultz case the District Court of Appeal said: "The Congress 
having given the right under the Federal Employers' Liability 
Act to an injured party to maintain an action for damages in 
the courts of the district where the defendant is doing business 
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at the time the suit is the of venue thus 
granted cannot be frustrated for reasons of convenience or 
expense. "\Ve are not concerned with the or the wisdom 
of such legislation. The of 
the laws passed by the 
legislative enactments or to laws because 
given rise to consequences which may not been contem-
plated by the Congress, no matter how tl1e results." "We 
hold that the courts of California may with 
the Constihdion of the United decline on the basis of 
forum non conveniens to take 
the Federal Employers' 
action which arose without the 
and non-resident against a 
of an action under 
founded on a cause of 




road company for a hearing in that case and it the 
law of this state until today when the 
by its decision in the case at bar 
Schultz case. 
of this court 
disapproved the 
Since this court decided Leet v. Um:on Pac. R. 25 Ca1.2d 
605 [155 P.2d 42, 158 A.I,.R. , relying upon Miles v. 
Illinois Central R. 315 U.S. 698 S.Ct. 827, 86 L.Ed 
1129], and Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. J[epner, 314 U.S. 44 
[62 S.Ct. 6, 86 L.Ed 28], holding that a state court has no 
power to refuse to exercise jurisdiction in a federal ' 
liability case by use of the doctrine of nonconveniens or 
otherwise, the United States Court ignored those 
cases in deciding Southern R. Co. v. 340 U.S. 1 [71 
S.Ct. 1, 95 L.Ed. 3]. The court held in the case that 
a state court could refuse to determine a federal employers' 
liability case under the doctrine of non conveniens as 
long as it treated all actions and and non-
citizens of the state similarly. In a later case the court held 
that the courts of the state in which the occurred and 
in which plaintiff was a resident could not, in an action by 
the railroad, enjoin plaintiff from maintaining a federal em-
ployers' liability action in the court of another state although 
the latter state court was not a convenient forum. The basis 
of the holding was that the Federal ' Liability Act 
(45 U.S.C.A. §56) gave the injured person a right to sue in 
the latter court and the former court could not take it away. 
(Pope v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 345 U.S. 379 [73 S.Ct. 
749, 97 I1.Ed. 1094].) Tl1e court further held that the amend-
ment to the federal law (28 U.S.C.A. § 1404(a)) authorizing 
Mar. 593 
North 
:594 PmcE v. A'I'CHrsoN, T. & S. F. RY. Co. [42 C.2d 
433 [53 P.2d1011]; Paras v. Lower 
California Dev. 688 [151 P. 35] ; Roberts v. 
75 Cal. 203 P. ; Loranger v. Nadea~~, 215 
P.2d63, 84 A.L.R. ; Hudson v. Von Hamm, 
85 Cal.App. 323 [259 P. . ) As expressed in Loranger v. 
supm, 215 Cal. 362, 366: "It is the general rule in 
tort actions that the court if it has ;jurisdiction of the 
necessary parties, and can do substantial justice between them 
in accordance with its ovvn forms of procedure, enforce the 
foreign law, if it is not contrary to the public policy of the 
forum, to abstract justice or pure morals, or injurious to the 
welfare of the people of the state of the forum ... In Loucks 
v. Standard Oil Co., 224 N.Y. 99 [120 N.E. 198, 202], it was 
said : 'The courts are not free to refuse to enforce a foreign 
right at the pleasure of judges, to sttit the individual notion 
of or 'l'hey do not close their doors, unless 
help would violate some fundamental principle of justice, some 
prevalent conception of good morals, some deep-rooted tradi-
tion of the common weaL' In Reynolds v. Day, 79 ·wash. 499 
[hR.A. 1916A, 432, 140 Pac. 681], it was said: 'Under the 
rule of comity, rights vvhich have accrued by the law of another 
state or nation are treated as valid everywhere. When the 
action is transitory and the jurisdiction of the parties can 
be obtained by service of process, the foreign law, if not con-
trary to the public policy of the state where the action is 
brought, nor contrary to abstract justice or pure morals, nor 
calculated to injure the state or its citizens, will be recognized 
and enforced. This rule applies to actions ex contmcht and 
actions ex delicto. In all cases, the right to recover is gov-
enwrl by the lex loci, and not by the lex fori.' " (Emphasis 
added.) \Vith respect to the duty of our courts to enforce 
federally created rights (the Federal Employers' Liability 
Act is such), this court, contrary to the majority opinion, 
considers it their mandatory duty and is not concerned with 
the imagined overcrowding of our courts \Vith such cases. 
In JJ1ille1· v. JJ1nnicipal Conrt, 22 Cal.2il 818 [142 P.2d 297], 
we had before us the question of whether the state municipal 
court was required to enforce the federal emergency price 
control law. \Ve held that it was, stating: ''As Congress 
in the lawful exercise of a constitutional power, by its 
statutes declares the policy for both the people and the states 
Second Employers' Liability Cases, supra, p. 57), so 
does it declare the policy of the people and of the states 
with regard to the enforcement of a law such as the Emer-
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gency Price Control Act of 1942. In enforcing that act by 
assuming jurisdiction of a consumer action pursuant to con-
gressional mandate, in the course of the exercise of its ordi-
nary jurisdiction, a state court is not entertaining an action 
created by a totally unrelated sovereign, but is merely yield-
ing to the superior exercise of a lawful right granted Congress 
by the United States Constitution. 
'' ... But, considering the intent of the framers of the 
Constitution, the acts of the early Congresses, and the pro-
visions of article VI establishing the supremacy of federal 
law, it seems clear that a state court, otherwise competent 
to exercise jurisdiction over the subject-matter, the parties, 
and the amount in controversy, must assume jurisdiction of 
an action created by federal law enacted pursuant to a legiti-
mate federal function, ... 
''Any argument of hardship which, it may be asserted, 
will result from the additional burden of litigation in state 
courts, must be considered settled by the Supreme Court of 
the United States. 'vVe are not disposed,' the court observed, 
'to believe that the exercise of jurisdiction by the state courts 
will be attended by any appreciable inconvenience or con-
fusion; but, be this as it may, it affords no reason for declin-
ing jurisdiction conferred by law. The existence of the juris-
diction creates an implication of duty to exercise it, and 
that its exercise may be onerous does not militate against that 
implication.' " (Emphasis added; Miller v. Municipal Court, 
22 Cal.2d 818, 850-851 [142 P.2d 297] .) Thus there is no 
basis for the comments in the majority opinion about the 
supposed burden of determining transitory actions. It is 
the fixed policy of this state to enforce at least federally 
created rights without regard to convenience. Unless the 
Miller case is overruled the majority opinion cannot stand ; 
in any event, any repudiation of it should be done by the 
l1egislature, not by this court. 
The difficulty of stating properly the circumstances under 
which the doctrine should or shonld not result in dismissal 
(later discussed), is an additional reason why it should not 
be adopted-why it is more appropriately a legislative prob-
lem. Questions of venue to which the present problem is 
analogous have been traditionally a legislative or constitu-
tional matter. (People v. Zegras, 29 Cal.2d 67 [172 P.2d 
883]; San .Jose I. & C. Storage Co. v. San Jose, 19 Cal.App. 
2d 62 [64 P.2d 1099] ; Perkins v. Winder, 123 Cal.App. 467 
1J. 
eivil cases.'~ '' 
" 
exceptional case 
. & S. P. RY. Co. C.2d 
to all other 
to 
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a railroad in an isolated or 
from the exercise of the right to 
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down by different courts is 
thus bound to rise over 
"A district in United States v. E. I. duPont de Ne-
mours & Co. with the 
stated: 
'' ' ... To niceties in hal-
the relative conveniences and inconveniences of all 
to any resort must be had 
's scale a ball; neither of which 
are available to this court.' 
"Utter confusion is in the law .... 
''The courts have all taken the attitude in cases decided 
under Section that set standard or policy can 
be attitude of the courts is re-
v. w. [89 
of defendant for seeks "a clarifi-
cation of the policy of the Court with respect to cases of 
this character brought it in the Northern District 
of Ohio.'' Let it be understood that the Court is 
~~fu ~ ~ 
a slide rule to enable them to calculate with mathematical 
precision the result that will be reached on motions to transfer 
that may be filed in other cases. All cases will be heard and 
decided on their facts. The very 
of the statute under which this motion filed 
strates the of this conclusion. The 
Court, in of this any other case, which 
be announced is that be followed. 
it has not been the 
which will 
remedy.'' v. 
67 S.Ot. 839, 843, 91 L.Ed. 1055.' 
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''The widespread confusion in the law resulting from the 
present more or less universal practice of filing either motions 
to transfer or dismiss has reacted to the special disadvantage 
of railroad men caused to suffer injuries not fatal or perma-
nently crippling and especially when injury occurred in 
sparsely settled communities, and when the injured employee 
resides at a railroad point or division where it is impossible 
to obtain competent counsel or to have the case tried and 
heard in a court experienced in trials of this class. The threat 
of using and employing these motions is a form of mental 
coercion or compulsion decidedly advantageous to the railroad 
and disadvantageous to the employee. Many lawyers will not 
undertake the prosecution of these cases knowing of the diffi-
culties and the expense, time, and effort of trying in effect 
several lawsuits. Therefore, the railroads are able to settle, 
especially in this western country, this class of cases on their 
own terms .... " (Parnell Black and John L. Black, Injus-
Uces in the Federal Forum Non Conveniens Rule, 3 Utah L. 
Rev. 314, 317-320; see, also, 41 Cal.L.Rev. 507; 38 Va.L.Rev. 
569.) 
Substantial authority in other states has rejected the doc-
trine. (See cases collected, 35 Cal.L.Rev. 380, 388.) 
Assuming the doctrine is available, difficult problems de-
velop, such as the circumstances relevant to whether a dis-
missal is proper, the review of the trial court's determination 
of the question, and the injustices inherent in its application. 
Among the circumstances justifying a dismissal the major-
ity opinion relies heavily on the inconvenience to our courts-
congested calendars and the use of our courts by nonresidents. 
I have above pointed out that this factor can have no signifi-
cance in view of our decision in Miller v. Municipal Court, 
supra, 22 Cal.2d 818. In addition to that, however, the fed-
eral courts have not considered it is a factor in applying the 
transfer provisions of the federal law which are based on 
convenience. It is stated with supporting authority that: 
"However, a striking demonstration of the novelty in the 
new federal doctrine of forum non conveniens based on 
1404 (a) is that inconvenience to the court appears to play 
no part in the exercise of discretion to transfer. The most 
crowded district court in the nation, that of the Southern 
District of New York, has retained cases (some of which 
promised large expenditures of time and effort) without con-
sidering its own convenience in its ascertainment of the most 
suitable forum. A similar course has been followed by other 
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burdened courts. On the other cases have been trans-
ferred from current or relatively uncrowded dockets to over-
burdened courts which were more convenient for litigants and 
witnesses. 
''The language of some opinions seems to indicate that con-
venience to the court is indeed an important factor under 
1404 (a), but an analysis of the facts meriting transfer in 
these cases indicates that convenience to the court was really 
unimportant." (Factors of Choice for Venue Transfer Under 
28 U.S.C.A. § 1404(a), 41 Cal.L.Rev. 507, 518-519.) 
The majority opinion states that whether the statute of 
limitations may have run pending the commencement of the 
action in a state court and its proposed dismissal, is not a 
circumstance to be considered; that plaintiff takes and should 
take the risk of choosing the right forum. This is indeed 
harsh. He is forced to speculate not only on how the trial 
court may decide the question but also what the views of an 
appellate court may be. As evident from the confusion in 
the federal case above discussed, such an impossible burden 
should not be placed upon him. Suppose a case where the 
location of the witnesses is equally divided between the state 
of the chosen forum and another or other factors are equally 
balanced, the plaintiff has no means of predicting the .court's 
decision. He is left at the mercy of the defendant-must 
have his prior approval of a particular court. Plaintiff hav-
ing· the right to have a particular court exercise its jurisdic-
tion, and that court having jurisdiction, should be able to 
have the dismissal denied in any case where the statute of 
limitations will have run by the time that issue is finally 
determined. As said by a writer on the subject: "And all 
cases hold that jurisdiction must be assumed if the defendant 
is not subject to process, or the statnte of limitations has rnn, 
in the state that he claims is more appropriate." (Emphasis 
added; Barrett, The Doctrine of Forttm Non Conveniens, 
35 Cal.L.Rev. 380, 419-420.) 
The review on appeal of the trial court's decision on the 
motion to dismiss presents many problems. If the motion 
is denied it would be an interlocutory order and not appeal-
able but would be reviewable on the appeal from the judg-
ment. If plaintiff had obtained judgment the case would 
have, of course, been tried with all the expense, time and 
inconvenience of witnesses involved. Yet presumably the 
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State, arH1 that not a con-
vcnJcnt foTtun for the \VH:nesses 21Hl thut the disu1issnl of the 
action will serve the of If the eourt uetormines to 
grant the motion, it shall make an order which shall impose 
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it could, and embrace rules of procedure 
to guide the courts in the application of such doctrine. The 
majority here appear to be oblivious to these considerations. 
For the foregoing reasons I would reverse the judgment. 
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied April 28, 
1954. Carter, was of the that the petition should 
be granted. 
such conditions as the court in its discretion deems ;just and reasonable, 
but, in any event, such interlocutory order shall :require that there be 
filed in the action a written agreement executed by the moving defendant 
and such other defendants as the court shall determine, which agreement 
as to each such defendant shall contain 
''(a) Such stipulations as may be necessary to provide effectively that 
plaintiff may bring and maintain an action upon the same cause of 
action in such jurisdiction or jurisdictions as the court shall determine or, 
if such action cannot be brought and maintained in any such jurisdiction, 
that the interlocutory order and any final dismissal shall be vacated and 
that the time within which the action must be brought to trial shall 
eommcnce on the date when the interlocutory order or dismissal is so 
vacated; and 
"(b) Such stipulations as may be necessary to suspend effectively all 
stntutes of limitations which have not expired at the time the action was 
commenced for a period sufficient to make effective the provisions of the 
foregoing subdivision (a) which period shall be not less than 180 days 
after the dismissal shall become final; and 
" (c) Such stipulations as may be necessary to assure that the moving 
defendant, and such other defendants as the court shall determine, will 
voluntarily make a general appearance in, or !Je subject to the process of 
a comt in the jurisdiction or jurisdictions determined by the court as 
provided in subdivision (a). 
"Upon proof that the conditions of the interlocutory order have been 
performed within the time allowed, the court, upon motion, shall there-
upon enter a judgment of dismissal. Ii' the eonditions are not performed, 
the court, upon motion, shall vacate the interlocutory order and enter 
an order den;·ing the motion or make such other order as is just. An 
interlocutory order hereunder is an appealable order. 
'' Tlle party making the motion shall have the burden of proof that 
the r.nnse of action did not arise within this State, that a court of this 
8tate is not n convenient forum for the parties and witnesses and that 
dismissnl will serve the interests of justice.'' 
